Freedom of speech and expression, an unseen pillar of Confucianism

Freedom of speech and expression, an unseen pillar of Confucianism

Contrary to widespread misconception, freedom of speech and expression does not go against Confucian’s principles but is an essential condition for the realisation of ethical conduct and moral governance.

Classical Chinese philosophy entered the international human rights discourse in 1948 when Chinese scholar Lo Chung-shu contributed a Confucian perspective to the United Nations’ consultations for drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In his groundbreaking five-page paper, Lo advocated for human rights, including freedom of expression, through a Confucian lens. Though concise, his work demonstrated how traditional Chinese thought could serve as a homegrown foundation for human rights, offering an alternative framework to liberalism.

Understandably, Lo kept a low profile on human rights issues, having lived under the shelter of Communist China since 1949. However, his Confucian approach to human rights has endured. A new generation of Confucian scholars has carried his unfinished project into the 21st century. These scholars delve deeper and broader, interpreting and justifying rights through a Confucian lens. They breathe life into Confucianism by integrating human rights principles, with some even arguing that Confucianism can enrich modern understandings of human rights. Together, they present a compelling Confucian perspective on human rights. Below, we outline how this perspective is constructed, with a particular focus on freedom of speech.

Virtue-based ethics for personal perfection

Philosophically, Confucianism upholds virtue-based ethics as a foundation for ethics-driven politics. This Confucian vision aspires to create an ideal community characterised by benevolence, moral governance, and social harmony. At its core lies the foundational virtue of benevolence (Ren), which embodies the capacity to empathise with others, treat them with respect, and care for their well-being. Confucians believe that through continuous learning and practice, individuals can cultivate their cognitive ability to distinguish between moral good and evil, as well as develop the emotional capacity to extend benevolence to others.

An important means of fostering benevolence in Confucianism is the practice of rites (Li), a set of behavioural norms designed to express benevolence in accordance with the specific relationships individuals hold within the social web. For example, the duties owed to one’s parents differ from those owed to friends or students, yet all are grounded in the principle of benevolence. By learning and practising these rites, individuals not only deepen their understanding of benevolence but also gain opportunities to reflect on whether the rites effectively embody it. Where they fall short, adjustments can be made to better align with benevolence.

Ethics-driven politics for moral governance

The Confucian concept of benevolence remains central in politics as it does in ethics; the distinction lies only in the domain of its application. On a personal level, individuals pursue benevolence in their private relationships, while in the public sphere, the state embodies benevolence through governance. A ruler, as Confucian thought dictates, must demonstrate respect and care for the people, attending to both their material and spiritual well-being. This is essentially an extension of personal benevolence to the broader, impersonal public. By exemplifying moral governance, a ruler inspires and cultivates the virtue of benevolence among the populace, creating a virtuous cycle where enlightened citizens contribute to the ethics and politics of care. In this framework, moral governance fosters a moral citizenry.

In Confucian thought, the rule of benevolence is not a royal privilege but an inescapable obligation of the sovereign toward the people. This duty stems from the foundational belief that the people hold a decisive role in governance. Crucially, the voice of the people is seen as the voice of Heaven. Absolute power, exercised by the sovereign, is understood to be granted by Heaven on the condition that the ruler upholds the people’s will. Should the ruler fail in this duty, he is justly subject to removal.

In ordinary times, the government is expected to nourish and educate the people through practical measures such as improving livelihoods, reducing taxes, maintaining peace, and providing education. Policies must reflect public opinion, and decisions regarding the hiring and dismissal of officials or the execution of convicts should be evaluated based on their acceptability to the people. In extraordinary times, such as during a regime change, the people’s support—or lack thereof—determines who inherits political power from a declining dynasty.

Aligned with this belief in popular sovereignty, Mencius even endorses the right to revolt, viewing it as a legitimate response to a corrupt regime. A ruler who “offends against humanness” and “rightness” forfeits his mandate, making rebellion and the removal—or even execution—of a tyrant morally justified.

The role of freedom of speech and expression in Confucianism

As outlined above, Confucian philosophy envisions a perfectionist society, striving to create an ideal world where individuals embody virtue-based ethics in both private and public spheres. This vision rests on the belief that every individual, through education and practice, is capable of acquiring and actualising moral virtues. This perspective carries three significant implications for human rights, particularly the right to information.

First, Confucianism rejects the notion of “rights for rights’ sake,” as it overlooks the purpose and value of human rights within the Confucian framework. Instead, the acceptance of rights and the protection of certain activities should be evaluated based on their alignment with Confucian ideals. Rights that contribute to moral cultivation and social harmony are to be upheld and promoted. Conversely, activities such as hate speech, which Confucians view as detrimental to social cohesion, should be excluded from human rights protection and prohibited.

Accordingly, the justification for freedom of expression should emphasise its instrumental value in fostering ethical and political practice. While Confucianism values moral conduct driven purely by moral motives, it rejects both blind adherence to tradition and utilitarian justifications that prioritise desirable outcomes over ethical integrity. Cultivating moral awareness and ability requires a lifelong process of learning, practising rites, and self-reflection. Rather than coercion, this process relies on autonomous reflection and moral cognition, allowing individuals to commit to Confucian values through thoughtful choice. As one commentator noted, two conditions are essential for achieving this reflective commitment: the absence of coercion and access to diverse ethical perspectives for deliberation and choice. Freedom of expression and access to information are therefore critical, as they enable individuals to engage in this process of ethical deliberation.

In the realm of politics, the necessity of freedom of expression becomes even more apparent. Both Confucius and Mencius, as recorded in the Analects and Mencius, emphasised the importance of public discourse and criticism for social and political progress. They openly criticised flawed ethical ideas and misguided policies of rulers and ministers in their times. Mencius, in particular, urged ministers to fulfil their duty of remonstrance when rulers erred seriously. He also actively condemned unorthodox ideas he considered heretical while defending Confucius’s vision of an ethical world rooted in benevolence.

These efforts to advance Confucian goals presuppose the existence of a functioning public sphere that facilitates the free exchange of ideas and information. Freedom of expression, therefore, not only supports the cultivation of virtue but also underpins the Confucian ideal of moral and political governance.

Mencius’s consistent efforts to critique rulers underscore the fallibility of sovereigns wielding unchecked absolute power. They also highlight a broader issue: the viability of the Confucian perfectionist vision. Without institutional safeguards, a society that relies solely on the goodwill of the sovereign and voluntary cooperation among its people may struggle to achieve its idealistic goals, and even if achieved, may find them unsustainable. To address this, legal protections for human rights can serve as contingency measures—or what might be called a “fallback apparatus”—to protect the vulnerable and uphold ethical governance.

On a personal level, consider a scenario where a husband-wife relationship deteriorates, leading to abuse. How can the victim be protected? Legal measures, such as prohibitions against torture, can provide crucial support. Additionally, freedom of expression can play a vital role by raising public awareness about family violence and facilitating dialogue on better policy solutions through the exchange of ideas and factual reporting.

On the political front, imagine a situation where university authorities threaten to disband a student union if its leaders take sides on political issues. Or, consider a sovereign who fails to nourish the people and indulges in exploitative, rent-seeking policies. Empowering individuals with participatory rights in governance is a long-term solution, but open discussion grounded in accurate information is an equally vital tool. Public discourse can illuminate what is at stake, galvanise public support, and exert pressure on authorities to correct their course and align with the principles of benevolent governance.

Confucian philosophy also emphasises the importance of responsibility and social harmony. While people have the right to express themselves for moral cultivation, political progress, or redress of grievances, such expression should aim to engage all parties in dialogue that fosters mutual understanding and respect while seeking constructive solutions. By balancing rights with responsibilities and emphasising care and concern for others, the exercise of free speech can ideally lead to informed and productive public discourse.

Conclusion

In conclusion, rather than rejecting human rights, Confucianism embraces those rights that further its honourable aims. It recognizes the need for human rights both as a fallback mechanism for damage control and as a tool for enhancing reflective commitment to Confucian virtues, monitoring those in power, and promoting healthy politics. Furthermore, its emphasis on social harmony and mutual respect encourages the thoughtful use of free speech to strengthen social cohesion.

It should be noted that the Confucian arguments for free speech presented here are not intended to surpass other justifications. Nor do we deny that certain streams of Chinese thought oppose freedom of expression or resist intellectual engagement. Our purpose is simply to show that Confucian philosophy is not only conceptually compatible with the idea of freedom of expression but also practically reliant on it to ensure its vision is viable and sustainable.

Andrew Y. To
A retired journalism teacher, Andrew Y. To is a current affairs commentator specialising in China and Hong Kong. His coauthored book, Media, Internet, and Social Movement in Hong Kong: Control and Protest, was published in Summer 2024.  

 

Further readings

ANGLE, Stephen. 2009. “Human Rights and Harmony” (in Chinese). Chinese Philosophy and Culture, Vol. 4. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303327906_renquanyuhexie.
CHAN, Joseph. 1999. “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China.” In The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, edited by Joanne R. BAUER and Daniel A. BELL, p. 212-237. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHAN, Joseph. 2013. Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
ELSTEIN, David. 2016. “Confucian Reflective Commitment and Free Expression.” European Journal of Political Theory 19 (3): 314-333.
HSIAO, Kung-chuan. 1979. History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume 1: From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century, A.D. Translated by Frederick W. MOTE. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 2 and 3.
HSIEH, Yu-wei. “The Status of the Individual in Chinese Ethics.” In The Chinese Mind, edited by Charles A. MOORE, p. 307-322. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.