In Republican China—which stretched from the Xinhai revolution that put an end to China’s last imperial dynasty in 1911, to the founding of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949—, despite ideological differences between liberal and communist intellectuals, they shared a common conviction: the paramount importance of freedom of speech for social and political progress, personal growth, and the advancement of knowledge. As will be briefly demonstrated, while their reasoning on the value of free speech for public and private interests and their methods for achieving these goals differed, these reflections collectively represented intellectual responses to the challenges of modernity following the fall of China’s empire in 1911. In what follows, we will examine the basic ideas and arguments of two leading communist intellectuals, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, alongside the perspectives of a prominent liberal thinker, Hu Shih, to explore their shared concern for freedom of speech and their contrasting approaches to it. 

A fundamental condition for the continuous progress of civilisation 

Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), a leader of the New Culture Movement and a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), regarded freedom of speech as a fundamental condition for the continuous progress of civilisation. He argued that only when people’s right to free expression is unrestricted can they expose the weaknesses and shortcomings of existing laws and societal norms. This process, he believed, is essential for identifying legal loopholes and driving improvements.

Chen emphasised that the freedom of criticism and resistance enjoyed in the past had been instrumental in shaping the current state of law and civilisation. However, he warned that if individuals were prohibited from voicing objections to existing laws, legal reform would come to a standstill. At best, society might preserve the status quo, but it would lose the opportunity to build a more advanced and just community in the future. For Chen, the flourishing of free speech was indispensable for ensuring that civilisation continues to move forward.

On the other hand, Chen observed that the absence of freedom of speech fosters an environment conducive to the Chinese tendencies of lying and empty talk. For example, official propaganda, aimed at boosting morale during the anti-Japanese war effort, often consisted entirely of positive news. Meanwhile, the public willingly accepted these exaggerated and deceptive stories. This “perfect match” created a void of ignorance, preventing people from recognising the real dangers they faced and the problems that needed to be addressed.

Moreover, this environment encouraged a culture of irresponsibility and cynicism, where no one cared about the truth or falsehood of what was said or heard. Chen argued that the prevalence of dishonesty was not due to any inherent inferiority in the Chinese people but rather the result of a system in which individuals were punished for telling the truth. Over time, this led to widespread silence and self-censorship. To repair this void of ignorance and dishonesty, Chen urged people to speak the truth. He believed that the remedy for this culture of silence lies in the protection and promotion of freedom of speech.

A defining feature of modernity

In politics, constitutional rule is fundamentally supported by freedom of speech, particularly political speech. As Chen argued, modern states are organised not only according to their constitutions, which reflect the general will of the people, but also operate on the basis of majority support. To honour the principles of constitutional rule, governments must shape their policies in response to public opinion.

Chen emphasised that governments should actively seek consensus from the general public rather than relying solely on the views of political parties, which he considered the starting point, not the culmination, of public opinion. Failure to do so, he warned, would reduce the state to a tyranny driven by partisan interests rather than the collective good.

For Chen, freedom of speech was the defining hallmark of modernity. In 1933, while defending himself against charges of treason levelled by the ruling Kuomintang government for spreading communist ideas, he lamented that such actions were akin to turning back the clock by centuries. He criticised a system where opposing the government or its officials, or merely advocating communist thought, could be deemed as “endangering the Republic of China.” Chen likened these practices to the witch hunts against unorthodox thinkers in ancient China or the persecution of heretics and scientists by religious courts during the Middle Ages. Such actions, he argued, sent a clear signal to the world: “China is not a modern country.” 

Even during the Japanese invasion of China, Chen remained steadfast in his defence of freedom of speech. While he supported the call for cooperation and solidarity among all political forces in their fight against Japanese aggression, he resisted pressure from some within the United Front to enforce ideological unity. He considered such demands both senseless and dangerous. It was senseless, Chen argued, because if various parties were unified in thought, they would effectively merge into one, eliminating the need for cooperation altogether. More alarmingly, he warned that the pursuit of ideological unity could become a pretext for the suppression or elimination of other parties, paving the way for a single-party state. 

“Use freedom of speech to destroy dangerous ideas, not prohibit freedom of speech on the pretext of dangerous ideas.”

While Chen Duxiu’s analysis focused on practical issues ranging from politics to culture, Li Dazhao (1889-1927), another co-founder of the CCP, offered a theoretical framework to underscore the paramount importance of freedom of speech and thought. Addressing concerns about the spread of dangerous ideas as a potential consequence of free speech, Li dismissed this as a false problem.

Li viewed freedom of speech and thought as essential tools for acquiring knowledge. Under the guidance of knowledge, he believed, people would naturally discern right from wrong. Using a vivid analogy, he argued that thoughts themselves pose no danger to the informed, just as a deep pool is harmless to a pedestrian walking watchfully beside it in clear daylight. Even if heretical or irrational ideas emerge, he insisted that they should be openly discussed. Once their true meaning is fully understood, he argued, people would reject them, and no harm would result.

Li asserted that knowledge would inevitably triumph over ignorance. Therefore, he advised: “Use freedom of speech to destroy dangerous ideas, not prohibit freedom of speech on the pretext of dangerous ideas.” Prohibiting free speech, he contended, is both a flawed solution and a moral failing. It fosters ignorance by hindering the pursuit of knowledge and teaches hypocrisy by denying people their freedom of belief.

On the liberal front, Hu Shih (1891-1962), widely regarded as a pioneer of the Chinese Renaissance in the early 20th century, championed freedom and democracy as defining hallmarks and countervailing forces against totalitarianism and its oppressive practices.

Critical examination and mutual challenge

Methodologically, Hu’s intellectual skepticism demanded scientific evidence as the basis for resolving ideological disputes, rather than treating political beliefs as unquestionable truths. This ongoing process of critical examination and mutual challenge, needless to say, must be sustained by freedom of speech and access to information. Culturally, Hu appealed to the liberal tradition within Chinese culture as the intellectual foundation for practicing freedom. Thus, the denial of freedom not only undermines Chinese traditions but also disrupts the everyday lives of ordinary people.

In his political writings, Hu Shih emphasised creating the conditions for freedom to thrive rather than simply justifying its importance. Central to his vision was the establishment of a liberal democratic system to shield individuals from authoritarian oppression. He argued that such a system prevents majoritarian tyranny through institutional safeguards, including freedom of speech and thought, which protect minority interests while maintaining political equality. Furthermore, it ensures individuals the legal right to pursue personal development in their own way.

In Hu’s view, intellectual attitudes are just as vital as political institutions in safeguarding freedom. Reflecting on the history of religious persecution, he identified two key factors behind the suppression of speech and thought: intolerance of new ideas and beliefs that differ from one’s own, and the self-assured belief in one’s own infallibility. Hu reasoned that if one assumes their beliefs to be infallible, any differing religious or political ideas must be deemed wrong, treated as heresies, or labelled as enemies. Rather than directly refuting the notion of infallibility, Hu drew a broader lesson: tolerance is the foundation of all freedom. He called for magnanimity in accepting and tolerating “dissidents,” emphasising that without such tolerance, no dissident beliefs can truly enjoy freedom.

Freedom and democracy rooted in Chinese culture

Hu was optimistic that a free China would ultimately overcome the authoritarian threat posed by the CCP’s takeover in 1949. He placed his hope in three intellectual elements of Chinese culture. The first was the anarchist tradition inherited from Lao Tzu’s philosophy, particularly the concept of wu wei (non-action), which advocates for laissez-faire politics as the most effective form of governance. More than a naturalist belief in returning to a state of nature where doing nothing accomplishes everything, wu wei has been a widely practiced principle in Chinese history.

Hu argued that since the Han Dynasty, the central government has managed only a few critical departments, leaving the rest of the country to govern itself. This arrangement, he noted, prevented excessive government interference in people’s daily lives. Over centuries of practice, it fostered a “no-government mentality” among the Chinese people, one that resists and dislikes any form of suppression of freedom.

The second element, rooted in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, is the Confucian heritage of holding power to account. This tradition represents a time-honoured role of the intelligentsia to speak truth to power. Since the Warring States period, when ceaseless warfare and poor governance caused widespread suffering, Confucian elites have boldly criticised and condemned irresponsible rulers and officials in defense of the people’s interests. Hu remarked that this self-imposed duty of criticism had evolved into a cultural heritage, with elites dedicated to bearing “the grave burden of the world.” Despite the harsh conditions of autocratic rule in imperial China, Hu noted, there had never been a shortage of brave individuals who continued their fight for freedom of speech and thought, even in the face of punishment and persecution.

The third element is the spirit of doubt and self-criticism deeply embedded in Chinese thought, which inspires people to think out of the box. Hu Shih highlighted how various Chinese thinkers—ranging from Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Mencius to Chuang Tzu, Han Fei, and Wang Chong—embodied this spirit by questioning accepted wisdom, dismantling entrenched dogmas, and promoting intellectual renewal. Empowered by this spirit of doubt, Hu argued, the Chinese people are not only capable of resisting communism but also of critically examining their civilisation’s ideas and institutions, paving the way for “profound and sweeping” reforms. 

Together, these intellectual legacies form the cultural foundation for resisting authoritarianism and embracing freedom of speech and thought. Historically, they enable the Chinese people to find solace in freedom of silence, courage in censuring governmental wrongs, and strength in exercising the right to doubt. For Hu, rejecting this heritage would not only sever China from its cultural roots but also rob it of the chance to establish a civilised nation based on freedom and democracy.

Throughout Republican China and beyond, putting these freedom-loving ideas about free speech into practice has been far from easy. Nonetheless, their political and theoretical appeal has left an indelible mark on the intellectual history of modern China, serving as a vital resource for rethinking the fate and future of freedom of speech in contemporary China.

Andrew Y. To
A retired journalism teacher, Andrew Y. To is a current affairs commentator specialising in China and Hong Kong. His coauthored book, Media, Internet, and Social Movement in Hong Kong: Control and Protest, was published in Summer 2024.